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Abstract We present a discrete n-person model of a dynamic strategic market game.
We show that for some values of the discount factor the game possesses a stationary
equilibrium where all the players make high bids. Within the class of all the high-
bidding strategies we distinguish between two classes of more and less aggressive
ones. We show that the set of discount factors for which these more aggressive strate-
gies form equilibria shrinks as n goes to infinity. On the other hand, the analogous
set for the less aggressive strategies grows to the whole interval (0,1) as n grows
to infinity. Further we analyze the properties of the value function corresponding to
these high-bidding equilibria. We also give some numerical examples contradicting
some other properties that seem intuitive.
Keywords Stochastic game · Strategic market game · n-person game · Stationary
equilibrium · Finite strategy space
1 Introduction
We consider n players—each holding an integral amount of money, competing for
portions of some nondurable commodity. At each of infinitely many stages of the
game, one unit of the good is brought to the market, and players bid integral parts of
their money for it. If a bid of a player is accepted, he pays for the good and receives
a share of the good according to some fixed rule of distribution. The sum of all the
payments is returned to the players at the end of the stage, each player receiving a
random share according to some probability distribution. The utility of the share of
the good consumed by a player is measured by some concave utility function. The
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utilities in subsequent periods of the game are discounted using some fixed discount
factor β .
The main problem for a player in this setting is to decide whether to spend more
now or to save the money for the future consumption. The decision has to take into
account both the magnitude of β (with smaller β it is intuitively more justified to
save less for the future) and the fact that the situation in the game may change in a
direction in which the same amount of good may be bought either at a lower or at a
higher price—which would make saving either more or less sensible. The fact that
the model is stochastic adds uncertainty as another important factor in the decision
making.
The models of this type were extensively studied in the literature, beginning with
the model of Shubik and Whitt [11], where a nonstochastic proportional-reward game
was considered. They showed that in their setting, the strategy of spending all the
money for the good becomes optimal for all the players as n becomes large enough.
Most of the further literature on the same topic breaks into two groups. In the first
one ([9, 10, 12, 13]) only 2-player games are considered, and in most of the papers
[9, 10, 13] only results about the form of equilibria for β small or large enough are
proved. Only [12] provides some information about the structure of the equilibria
for all the values of the discount factor. We should note here that in [10] the authors
claim that some of the results generalize to n-person games, however we are not given
information which ones and to what extent.
The second group of models were the ones with continuum of players [2, 4, 5].
Here the authors both provided general results characterizing stationary competitive
equilibria in their games and gave some simple examples illustrating them. [4] is a
relatively simple model, which can be viewed as a counterpart of the models studied
for 2 players, while [2, 5] are its extensions—[5] with borrowing and lending allowed
and [2] with a possible bankruptcy.
The only results about stochastic models with a number of players finite, but bigger
than 2 appear in [6]. In Chap. 3 there the author treats the n-person counterpart of the
proportional reward game from [10], providing results about the form of equilibria
for small values of β and discussing the situation when β approaches 1. In this paper
we provide a detailed analysis of n-person strategic market games with a “winner-
takes-all” payoff, analyzed before for a 2-player case in [10, 12] (in which an auction
is performed at every stage of the game). Unfortunately we have not proved general
results about the structure of equilibria for any n and any β . Nevertheless, similarly
as in [11], the results we prove are strong enough to imply an asymptotic result, true
for any value of β and n large enough. In our analysis we concentrate on the variant
of a “winner-takes-all” model studied for 2 players in [12], with a fixed simple rule
of redistribution of the money, but we provide some insights of how these results
extrapolate to more general settings. In our focus on this auction-based model we
also have in mind that all the models studied for large number (continuum) of players
were proportional-reward games (as this kind of auction model has no counterpart
with continuum of players), and so this is the first analysis of this kind of model for a
number of players bigger than 2.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Sect. 2 we describe formally our
model and introduce the notation used throughout the paper. In Sect. 3 we present
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all our main results and give a detailed analysis of their implications and possible
extensions. The final section contains all the proofs.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we provide all the notation and definitions used in the subsequent part
of the paper. In particular, we define special types of strategies that will be proved to
form equilibria in some cases in the next section.
We begin with a general description of the game under investigation as a stochastic
game.
1. State space of the game is the state of n-tuples of nonnegative integers summing
up to M ,
S =
{






k-th coordinate of the state variable x, xk , is the amount of money player k pos-
sesses at a specified stage of the game.
In the subsequent part of the paper we will also use the notation x(k), to denote
the k-th largest coordinate of x. If two coordinates have the same value then also a
number of x(k)s have the same value, for example if x = (5,5,3), x(1) = x(2) = 5
and x(3) = 3.
2. The set of actions available to player i in state x will be denoted by Ai(x). Of
course
Ai(x) = {0,1, . . . , xi}.
The set of all the actions available in any state will be denoted by Ai =⋃
x∈X Ai(x). For the actions we shall also use the notation a(k) to denote the k-th
largest action.
3. Daily reward to player i in state x, when players use actions (a1, a2, . . . , an) will
be denoted by ri(x, a1, a2, . . . , an). It depends on the rule of distribution of the
good after the bids are made, and therefore we shall define it after we introduce
this rule.
4. The law of motion between states q also depends on the rule of distribution of the
good, as well as on the second rule—rule of redistribution of money, and thus will
also be defined later.
In the next couple of definitions we make precise, what kind of solutions we look
for in our game. A strategy of player i is a sequence π¯i = (π1i , π2i , . . .), where πti ∈
P(Ai)(x
t ) is a distribution over the set of actions available to player i on the t-th
stage of the game in state xt , depending on partial history of the game up to its
t-th stage ht = (x1, a11, . . . , a1n, . . . , xt−1, at−11 , . . . , at−1n , xt ). We say that a strategy
f¯i = (π1i , π2i , . . .) of player i is stationary, when for every moment t , πti = fi(xt ) for
some fi : S → P(A). In the sequel we shall identify stationary strategy f¯i with fi .
The set of all the stationary strategies of player i will be denoted by Fi .
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The vector of strategies of the players f = (f1, . . . , fn) together with the initial
state x and the law of motion determine the unique probability distribution Px,f on
the infinite histories of the game (x, a11, . . . , , a
1
n, x
2, a21, . . . , a
2
n, . . .). The expected
discounted reward to player i is defined by the formula:










Throughout the paper, the discount factor β is assumed to satisfy 0 < β < 1.
A profile of (stationary) strategies f = (f1, . . . , fn) is called a (stationary) equi-
librium for the discounted stochastic game, iff for every x ∈ S and every player i,
Ji(x, f ) ≥ Ji
(
x, (f−i , π)
)
,
for every strategy π of player i. (Here and in the sequel the notation (y−i , z)
denotes vector y = (y1, . . . , yn) with its i-th coordinate replaced by z. Similarly,
(y−i−j , z1, z2) will denote y with its i-th coordinate replaced by z1 and j -th co-
ordinate replaced by z2 and so on for a bigger number of coordinates).
Next we define three special types of stationary strategies that will appear in our
results (here and in the sequel δ[z] denotes a degenerate probability distribution con-
centrated in point z).
A strategy fi of player i is a bold strategy if




) ⊂ {x(2) + 1, . . . , xi} if xi > x(2).
A strategy fi of player i is a weakly bold strategy if




) ⊂ {x(2), . . . , xi} if xi > x(2).
The sets of bold and weakly bold strategies of player i will be denoted respectively
by FBi and F
WB
i .
The strategy σi of player i defined by the formula:
σi(x) =
{
δ[x(2) + 1] if xi = x(1) = x(2),
δ[xi] otherwise
is called the simple bold strategy.
Now we present some more specific features of the model:
1. Rule of distribution of the good
There are two main rules of distribution of the good considered in the literature:
winner-takes-all rule [9, 10, 12, 13] and proportional reward rule [6, 9–11]. In our
paper we consider only the first one. In winner-takes-all game at every stage of
the game an auction is made. The winner of this auction (a player whose bid was
the highest) receives whole of the good and has to pay for it. In case there are two
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or more players with the highest bid, one of these players is chosen with a chance
move (with equal probability of being chosen for each player), and this player
consumes the whole portion and pays for it. Then (after the consumption) all of
the money paid is redistributed among the players according to some probability
distribution.
Daily reward to player i is thus defined by the formula
ri(x, a1, . . . , an) =
{
1
|{j :aj=ai }|ui(1) when ai = maxj aj ,
ui(0) when ai < maxj aj ,
where ui is a utility function of player i. We will assume every ui is concave
nondecreasing and satisfies ui(0) = 0.
2. The law of motion between states
The law of motion between states for such a game is determined by the prob-
ability distribution, according to which the money spent for good is redistributed
p(a(1)), where a(1) = maxj aj is the amount of money spent for the good. p(a(1))
is a distribution on the set{






Let x be current state of the game, Y(a(1))—a random vector with distribution
p(a(1)), and Z(a)—a random 0-1 vector with value 1 for exactly one element
of the set {j : aj = a(1)} and equal probability for each of them. Then a random
vector with distribution q(x, a1, . . . , an), X′ = (X′1, . . . ,X′n) is given by
X′k =
{
xk − ak(Z(a))k + (Y (a(1)))k if ak = a(1),
xk + (Y (a(1)))k otherwise.
It is tricky to write q with a closed-form formula for a general distribution
p(a(1)). However, it is possible in a specific case. In the case considered in the
next section, where the whole amount of money is redistributed to one player
with equal probabilities for each of them,1 transition probability is given for any
(x, a1, . . . , an) by the following formula:








(x−i−k, xi − ai, xk + ai)
]
, where ai = a(1).
Before we present our main results, we shall introduce two additional notions
appearing in the subsequent theorems:
1Similar results hold, and can be proved analogously, for a more general case, which will be referred to
in one of the subsections of the next section. The focus on this particular (and relatively simple) case is
motivated by the fact that it allows simplifying some of the notation, as well as giving the results in more
detail.
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Definition 1 A strategy profile f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) is symmetric if
(a) For any fixed i and j, k = i, fi(x−j−k, xk, xj ) = fi(x).
(b) For any i = j and two states x, y, if x = (y−i−j , yj , yi), then fi(x) = fj (y).
Definition 2 A profile of strategies of players other than i, g−i is symmetric to a
strategy fi of player i (we will denote it by2 g−i = sym(fi)) if f := (g−i , fi) is a
symmetric profile.
3 The Results
In the first main result of the paper we show when bold (weakly bold) selectors form
an equilibrium in the game under consideration.
Theorem 1
(i) For every n ≥ 3 and every β ≤ 13 , the game possesses a symmetric stationary
equilibrium f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn), where fi are bold strategies.




, the game possesses a symmetric
stationary equilibrium f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn), where fi are weakly bold strate-
gies.
(iii) For every β ≥ 12 there exists an nβ such that for every n ≥ nβ , there is no strategy
profile where the strategies of all the players are bold which is a stationary
equilibrium in the game.
Remark 1 One may think that in the result of part (i) of the theorem some bold strat-
egy fi could be replaced by the simple bold selector σi (which is a direct counterpart
of bold selectors considered in [10, 12]). The numerical example below shows that
this is not the case.
Consider the game with 3 symmetric players, ui(x) = x, β = 0.3 and M = 13.
The reward of a player using the simple bold strategy against simple bold strategies
of all the other players in this game is in state (7,2,4) equal to 1.12916. On the
other hand, if he uses another bold strategy, prescribing him to bid 7 in state (7,2,4),
and use the simple bold strategy in any other state, his reward in (7,2,4) is equal to
1.13032. This obviously implies that the profile of simple bold strategies is not an
equilibrium in such a game.3
Remark 2 The third part of the theorem could be written in a more precise form if we
considered some concrete bold strategy instead of any. For example, if we considered
the simple bold selector, we could prove that for any β > n2n−3 the profile (σ, . . . , σ )
cannot be an equilibrium in the game under consideration.
However, as seen from the example in Remark 1, there are situations when indeed
only some other bold selectors form an equilibrium in the game.
2It is straightforward to show that there may only be one strategy of player j symmetric to some given
strategy of i, thus the notation g−i = sym(fi ) (instead of g−i ∈ sym(fi )) is well justified.
3The same is true for smaller values of β .
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A natural consequence of this theorem is the following:
Corollary 1 For every β < 1 there exists an n such that n-person game possesses
a symmetric stationary equilibrium f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn), where fi are weakly bold
strategies.
In the second main result we present main properties of the reward functions in
equilibrium.
Theorem 2 Let β ∈ (0,1) and let V ∗i be the reward function of player i when all the
players apply equilibrium strategies from Theorem 1. Then:
(i) For any state x and every i, V ∗i (x) ≤ ui(1)1−β .
(ii) If x is such that xi < x(2) then V ∗i (x) ≤ 2βui(1)(n−(n−2)β)(1−β) .(iii) If x is such that xi < 2x(2) then
V ∗i (x) ≤
nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) .
(iv) Suppose that  ≤ x(2) and that xi = x(1) and xk = x(2). Then for any j = i, k:
|V ∗i (x−i−j , xi + ,xj − ) − V ∗i (x)|
≤ nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) .
(v) Function V ∗i is symmetric in the following sense: for any two k, j = i,
V ∗i (x−j−k, xk, xj ) = V ∗i (x).
Remark 3 Again, the results for 2 players suggest that V ∗ has stronger properties,
namely that it is nondecreasing in the following sense:
V ∗i (x−i−j , xi + ,xj − ) − V ∗i (x) ≥ 0 for  > 0.
The following example contradicts this supposition.
Take 3 symmetric players with ui(x) = x, M = 7 and β = 0.15. One may numer-
ically check that the profile (σ1, σ2, σ3) of simple bold selectors is an equilibrium
in such a game. However: V ∗1 (0,2,5) = 0.0588, V ∗1 (1,2,4) = 0.0574, V ∗1 (2,2,3) =
0.0588, V ∗1 (3,2,2) = 1.0588, V ∗1 (4,2,1) = 1.0574, V ∗1 (5,2,0) = 1.0588, so V ∗1 is
not monotonic in the above sense. We suppose that the lower bound in part (iv) of
Theorem 2 could however be improved upon.
3.1 Analysis of the Results
The results from Theorem 1 can be read in the following manner: as the number of
players grows, it is rational to be more aggressive, but only to some extent. If we
analyze the proof of this theorem, we see that the main reason for which the players
become more aggressive is that after a player loses his position as one of the leaders
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in terms of amount of money held, it is hard for him to return to a leading position,
and as n grows, the probability of returning to one of these top positions becomes
smaller. As our model is based on auctions in subsequent steps of the game, only the
money leaders can actively participate in the trade. Now, having in mind the main
dilemma of a player in our setting, which is whether to spend more now or to save it
for the future consumption, we see that if a player does not bid high when he has a
possibility of winning an auction, he risks that he will lose this possibility for a long
time. If he does, he may be in a better strategic situation when he is back in play, but
after such a long time his rewards will be discounted heavily, so he will not be able
to take advantage of this better strategic situation.
This also explains why it is sometimes better to be a little bit less aggressive (as
it is the case when weakly bold strategies are applied). Note that what we just wrote
can be put in another way as follows: What counts for a player is what he can gain
up to the moment when he loses position as one of the money leaders. That means
that it is rational for a player when n is high enough, to chose his strategy as if the
game was finished at the moment when he loses his position. In a particular situation
appearing in the proof of part (iii) of Theorem 1, a player knows that bidding less
at the beginning of the game will lower his expected daily reward by half, but at the
same time it will add him one more stage in which he will be an active trader, so for a
relatively high value of β saving this half for the future consumption will be rational.
This mechanism of choosing the strategy which would be optimal in a game with
finitely many periods seems to be the core of all the other anomalies which are enu-
merated in remarks after Theorems 1 and 2. If at some stage bidding more than what
is needed to win an auction (and what is prescribed by the simple bold strategy) gives
(at least with some probability) a possibility to add one more stage of activity, it is
better to use this more aggressive strategy. If a state with a bigger wealth is strategi-
cally worse (in the sense described above) than in another state with a smaller wealth,
the reward of a player in this first one is smaller than in the second one.
3.2 Possible Extensions
There are three main directions in which one could think of extending the results
presented in this paper. The first one concerns the rule of distribution of the good
based on the bids. Two standard rules appearing in the literature are auction and
proportional distribution. Obviously one could imagine some more complicated rules,
and, as long as in a rule of distribution of the good only a small group of the highest
bidders can gain anything (and small should mean shrinking in terms of percentage
as n grows), some counterpart of the results presented here (the asymptotic result in
particular) should definitely be true.
The second possible extension of our results is generalizing them to some other
rules of returning the money to the players after the consumption. It is clear from our
considerations that the same kind of result will hold if the probability of getting back
in trade after losing such a possibility decreases to 0 as n goes to infinity. So the main
point here would be checking if for a given rule different than the ours this is true.
The third interesting direction in which the results of our model could be gener-
alized is allowing borrowing and lending, as in [5] for a game with continuum of
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players. We think that in such a case our results could not be repeated, as the possi-
bility of lending would mitigate the effect of losing the position, unless the interest
rates were relatively high—then a result similar to ours seems highly possible.
4 Proofs
This section contains the proofs of all the theorems included in previous section. The
proof of the corollary is omitted as straightforward.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We precede main part of the proof by two technical lemmas. In the first one relations
between different constants appearing in the theorem’s proof are established.
Lemma 1 For any n ∈ N and β ∈ (0,1):
(i)
βui(1)
(n − (n − 1)β)(1 − β) <
2βui(1)
(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
<
nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) (1)
(ii)
ui(1) + (n − 2)β
n
2βui(1)





n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
)
= nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)






n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
)
+ βu1(1)
n(1 − β) .
Proof (i) To prove the first inequality first notice that β < 1 implies
n − (n − 2)β < 2(n − (n − 1)β).
But this immediately implies that
βui(1)
(n − (n − 1)β)(1 − β) <
2βui(1)
(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) .
The second inequality follows also from β < 1. Note that it implies that
2β < n − (n − 2)β
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and consequently
2β
n − (n − 2)β < 1.
We can further transform this inequality as follows:
n(1 − β) 2β
(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) < n,
(
(n − 2β) − β(n − 2)) 2β








(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) <
n
n − 2β ,
and finally:
2βui(1)
(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) <
nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) .







n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)






n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
)
= nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) .
To prove the inequality note that the inequality between two utmost terms in (1) can
equivalently be written as




n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)










n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)










n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
)
= nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) . 
The second lemma is straightforward, but we write it for the sake of the paper’s
completeness.
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Lemma 2 For every i, FWBi is a compact convex subset of RM|S|.
Now we can make the first step of the actual proof of the theorem. Fix n > 2
and for any profile of stationary strategies f define the operator Tf,i : B(S,R+) →






) + βv(x2)]. (2)
It is well-known from the theory of dynamic programming (see e.g. [7, 8]) that
Tf,i(v)(x) represents the expected payoff to player i when he plays fi(x) versus
f−i (x) on the first day, receives his one-day reward and is paid v(x2) at the next state
x2. It is also well-known that Tf,i is a contraction operator.
Next we can define the reward function corresponding to a best (maximizing the
payoff of player i) weakly bold strategy of player i, say fi (such a strategy exists, as
by Lemma 2 FWBi is a compact subset of a Euclidean space and discounted reward
is a continuous function of the strategy (by some standard dynamic programming
arguments, see e.g. Lemma 2.1 in [1])), when all the other players use some fixed
symmetric profile of weakly bold strategies4 f−i = (f1, . . . , fi−1, fi+1, . . . , fn),
V
f−i
i : S → R+. Again by standard dynamic programming arguments, V f−ii is the
unique fixed point of Tf,i .




v : S → R+ : ∀x ∈ S, v(x) ≤ ui(1)1 − β ;
∀x ∈ S such that xi < x(2), v(x) ≤ 2βui(1)
(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) ;
∀x ∈ S such that xi < 2x(2),
v(x) ≤ nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) ;
∀x ∈ S such that xi = x(1), k such that xk = x(2), j = i, k and  ≤ x(2),
|v(x−i−j , xi + ,xj − ) − v(x)|
≤ nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) ;
∀j, k = i, v(x−j−k, xk, xj ) = v(x)
}
.
Clearly it is a closed subset of a complete metric space of bounded functions from S
to R+ with supremum norm, B(S,R+), and hence also a complete metric space. We
can prove the following:
4Strategy fi is obviously induced by f−i . We give it a name and justify its existence because we shall use
it in the proof of Lemma 3.
158 Appl Math Optim (2012) 65:147–173
Lemma 3 Let β ∈ (0,1). Then V f−ii is a member of Vi .











k =i v(x−i−k, xi − a, xk + a) + βn v(x)]
+ (fi (x))x(2)|J(2)(x)| [ui(1)
+ ∑j∈J(2)(x)( βn ∑k =j v(x−j−k, xj − x(2), xk + x(2)) + βn v(x))]





k =j1 v(x−j1−k, xj1 − a, xk + a) + βn v(x)]
+ (fj1 (x))x(2)|J(2)(x)| [ui(1)
+ ∑j∈J(2)(x)( βn ∑k =j v(x−j−k, xj − x(2), xk + x(2)) + βn v(x))]





k =j1 v(x−j1−k, xj1 − a, xk + a) + βn v(x)]










if i ∈ J(2)(x) and j1 ∈ J(1)(x),
(3)
where J(1)(x) = {j : xj = x(1)} and J(2)(x) = {j : xj ≥ x(2)}. (Note that j1 can be
chosen arbitrarily in case when |J(1)(x)| > 1, since in that case J(1)(x) = J(2)(x) and
the first term when i ∈ J(2)(x) disappears).
As we already know, Tf,i is a contraction. In the remainder of the proof we will
show that Tf,i maps Vi into Vi . This of course will imply through Banach’s fixed
point theorem, that the fixed point of Tf,i , V f−ii , is an element of Vi , ending the
proof. We will break this part of the proof into five claims concerning each element
of the definition of Vi . Suppose v ∈ Vi .
Claim 1 Tf,i(v)(x) ≤ ui(1)1−β .
Clearly for any x ∈ S:





) ≤ ui(1) + ui(1)β1 − β = ui(1)1 − β .
Claim 2 For every x ∈ S such that xi < x(2), Tf,i(v)(x) ≤ 2βui(1)(n−(n−2)β)(1−β) .

















































































v(x−j−k, xj − x(2), xk + x(2)) + v(x)
)]}
.
Now note that the values of v can be bigger than 2βui(1)
(n−(n−2)β)(1−β) only in the first two
brackets. In the first one this is, because the wealth of player i is increased and so he
may enter J(2)(x). In the second one it is, because whenever some amount of money
is moved between two players from J(2)(x), the wealth of one of them can become
smaller than that of player i, and so i may enter J(2)(x) in his place. Note however
that this is only possible when |J(2)(x)| = 2—in any other case only the values of v
in the first bracket can be bigger than 2βui(1)
(n−(n−2)β)(1−β) . Putting together all that we































































(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
≤ 2βui(1)
n(1 − β) +
2β2(n − 2)ui(1)
n(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) =
2βui(1)
(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) ,
ending the proof of Claim 2.
Claim 3 For every x ∈ S such that xi < 2x(2),
Tf,i(v)(x) ≤ nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) .
Clearly we only need to consider the case when i ∈ J(2)(x) (the possibility when
i ∈ J(2)(x) is, as a consequence of part (i) of Lemma 1, covered by Claim 2). As
we use the characterization (3) of Tf,i which has three variants, it is convenient to
consider two cases:
















































ui(1) + (n − 2)β
n
2βui(1)





n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)










n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
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+ (fi(x))x(2)|J(2)(x)|
[
ui(1) + (n − 2)β
n
2βui(1)





n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)




ui(1) + (n − 2)β
n
2βui(1)





n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)







n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)






In the above set of inequalities the first one is a consequence of the following two
facts:
(1) In all of the states of the form5 y = (x−j−k, xj −a, xk +a) where a ≥ x(2) and
j, k = i, either yi = y(2) or i, k ∈ J(2)(y) with yi = xi = y(1) and yk = y(2) ≥ x(2). In
both cases obviously yi ≤ 2y(2). Only when k = i, it is possible that yi ≤ 2y(2).
(2) In the states z = (x−i−k, xi − a, xk + a) where a ≥ x(2) and k = i, clearly
zi < x(2) ≤ zk . If in addition k ∈ J(2)(x) or |J(2)(x)| > 2, there exists some j = i, k
such that zj = xj = x(2) > zi , and so for any k = i, j , z ∈ J(2)(z).
The second inequality is straightforward, as fi is a randomized stationary strategy,
and so the (fi(x))a for different values of a sum up to 1.
Finally, by part (ii) of Lemma 1 both terms under max are not bigger than
nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β),
which ends the proof of Case 1.











































5If we wanted to be precise, we should write “in state yjka = · · ·”, however adding this kind of information
complicates the notation without adding anything important for understanding this explanation. We use
similar convention in other explanations in the remainder of the paper.
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n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)













n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)







ui(1) + (n − 2)β
n
2βui(1)





n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
)]
≤ nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) ,
ending the proof of Case 2, and hence of whole Claim 3.
Claim 4 Suppose that  ≤ x(2) and that xi = x(1), xk = x(2) and j = i, k. Then
|Tf,i(v)(x−i−j , xi + ,xj − ) − Tf,i(v)(x)|
≤ nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) .
We will only consider the case when xi +  ≥ 2xk (if xi +  < 2xk , the result
follows immediately from Claim 3 and the fact that Tf,i(v) ≥ 0). To make the notation
(which is quite complicated anyway) shorter, we shall write y instead of (x−i−j , xi +
,xj − ). We will only prove
Tf,i(v)(y) − Tf,i(v)(x) ≤ nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) . (4)
The proof of the other inequality (with Tf,i(v)(x) − Tf,i(v)(y) on the LHS of the
inequality) follows along the same lines, with only difference that we need to modify
the strategy in state y, instead of in x.















6Consequently we will also write f˜ for the whole profile f with fi replaced by f˜i .
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Note that f˜i is still a weakly bold strategy. We will show that
Tf,i(v)(y) − Tf˜ ,i(v)(x) ≤
nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) .
Since by the definition fi is a best weakly bold strategy of player i, Tf˜ ,i(v)(x) ≤
Tf,i(v)(x), which will immediately imply (4).
By (3) applied to our situation we have:
























































































Now note that J(2)(y) ⊂ J(2)(x) and the only difference between the two sets may
be j , which may be an element of J(2)(x) and not of J(2)(y). Thus we have two cases:
Case 1: J(2)(x) = J(2)(y). We can omit all the elements in the second bracket of




|J(2)(x)| (as they are all positive), obtaining that in





























v(y−i−l , yi − a, yl + a)
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v(y−i−l , yi − xk, yl + xk)














v(y−m−l , ym − xk, yl + xk)




v(y) − v(x))]. (6)




(n−(n−2)β)(1−β) + 2βn (nui (1)n−2β + 2(n−2)β
2ui(1)
(n−2β)(n−(n−2)β)(1−β) ), as if a > xi , then the
fortune of player i in state z = (y−i−l , yi − a, yl + a) would be smaller than , and
thus, as long as l = k, also zi < xk = zk and zi < zl , so i ∈ J(2)(z). Of course when
k = l, zi < 2z(2), as either i ∈ J(2)(z) or zi = z(2) then.
The next thing we need to note is that the values in the second and the third bracket
can be bounded from above by β(nui(1)
n−2β + 2(n−2)β
2ui(1)
(n−2β)(n−(n−2)β)(1−β) ). This is because in
this case we have one of two situations:
(1) For the state s = (x−i−l , xi − xk, xl + xk), i is the leader, and then, as sl =





(2) i is not the leader in state s, and then we clearly see that
yi − xk = si +  < sl +  = (xl + xk) +  = (yl + xk) + ,
so in state s = (y−i−l , yi − xk, yl + xk), si < sl +  ≤ 2sl , and thus v(s) −










(n−2β)(n−(n−2)β)(1−β) ) + βu1(1)n(1−β) . Here the situation is analogous to that in the sec-




(n−2β)(n−(n−2)β)(1−β) ) (as here we do not know who enters J(2) in
place of player k), but not bigger than ui(1)1−β , which is the biggest possible value of v.
Since the coefficients of these four brackets are all positive and sum up to 1, (6)
cannot be bigger than
max
{
ui(1) + (n − 2)β
n
2βui(1)





n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
)
,




n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)







n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)






n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) ,
where the last inequality follows from part (ii) of Lemma 1.
Case 2: J(2)(x) = J(2)(y)∪{j}. It is important to notice that in this case xj = xk =
x(2). Again we can omit all the elements in the second bracket of (5) multiplied by∑
a>xi
(fi (y))a





























v(y−i−l , yi − a, yl + a)












v(y−i−l , yi − xk, yl + xk)














v(y−m−l , ym − xk, yl + xk)













v(y−i−l , yi − xk, yl + xk)














v(y−m−l , ym − xk, yl + xk)




v(y) − v(x))]. (7)
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Now note that it has already been proved (in the considerations of Case 1) that the val-




We will show that the same is true for the two remaining ones.
To prove the first of desired inequalities take sl = (y−i−l , yi −xk, yl +xk). One can
easily compute that (x−j−l , xj −xk, xl +xk) = (sl−i−j , sli + (xk −), slj − (xk −)).
But as xk − < xk + xl and xk − < xi − xk + (this last inequality is implied by
the assumption that we made at the beginning of the proof of Claim 4 that xi +  ≥






v(y−i−l , yi − xk, yl + xk) − v(x−j−l , xj − xk, xl + xk)

















n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)





n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)




n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) .
To prove the last inequality we need to use the assumption about symmetry of v






v(y−m−l , ym − xk, yl + xk) − v(x−j−l , xj − xk, xl + xk)






v(y−m−l , ym − xk, yl + xk) − v(x−m−l , xm − xk, xl + xk)
)
+ (v(y) − v(x))]
≤ nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) .
The inequality was proved in the proof of Case 1.
As we have shown that each of the brackets in (7) is not bigger than nui(1)
n−2β +
2(n−2)β2ui(1)
(n−2β)(n−(n−2)β)(1−β) , and the coefficients of each of them sum up to 1, this implies
that also (7) is not bigger than nui(1)
n−2β + 2(n−2)β
2ui(1)
(n−2β)(n−(n−2)β)(1−β) , ending the proof of
Claim 4.
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Claim 5 For any j.k = i,
Tf,i(v)(x−j−k, xk, xj ) = Tf,i(v)(x).
The claim follows immediately from the fact that v has the same property and the
definition of Tf,i (note that we do not use the actual indices of the players there, only
index all the players form J(1)(x), J(2)(x) and all the ones outside these sets, making
them interchangeable within these sets). 
In the remainder of the proof we shall consider the properties of one-step n-person
game (f,x,β) defined by the following objects:
• The action set of player i is Ai(x).

















i (x−j−k, xj − aj , xk + aj ) + V f−ii (x))]










i (x−j−k, xj − aj , xk + aj ) + V f−ii (x))]
if ai < maxj =i{aj }.
Lemma 4 Fix some symmetric profile of weakly bold strategies f and suppose all
of the players except i use randomized strategies fj (x) in game (f,x,β). Then for




the set of best responses of player i against f−i (x) of the

















i (a−i , bi)
]}
is either a subset of {x(2), . . . , xi} or, if this set is empty, is equal to Ai(x).
Proof First note that clearly Kf,x,βi is constant on the set {a ∈ Ai(x) : ai ≤ x(2) − 1},
as any weakly bold strategy of player j (fj in particular) prescribes to use action xj
as long as j is not the leader, so either i is the leader and any action smaller than
x(2) = maxj =i xj is smaller than what others use (in such a case he does not affect
his own payoff), or, if i is not the leader, the leader, say player k, uses randomized
strategy adopting only actions bigger than x(2) −1 (in such a case the action of player
i would not affect his payoff either). This immediately implies that Bf,x,βi (f−i ) =
Ai(x) when xi < x(2). To complete the proof it is enough to show that for i ∈ J(2)(x)
168 Appl Math Optim (2012) 65:147–173















i (a−i , x(2) − 1)
]
.
Without loss of generality we may assume that all of the players use nonrandomized
strategies and so we can skip the expected value operators, writing simply aj for the
action that fj (x) assigns probability 1.
Note that either maxj =i aj > x(2) and then Kf,x,βi (a−i , x(2)) = Kf,x,βi (a−i ,
x(2) − 1) or
K
f,x,β
i (a−i , x(2)) − Kf,x,βi (a−i , x(2) − 1)
= 1|J(1)(a−i )|(|J(1)(a−i )| + 1)
[








i (x−i−j , xi − x(2), xj + x(2))







i (x−i−k, xi − x(2), xk + x(2))
− V f−ii (x−j−k, xj − x(2), xk + x(2))
))]
. (8)
Since in each of the elements of the last sum k = j and j ∈ J(1)(a−i ) (or, in other
words, xj = x(2)), we know that x(2) ≤ (x−i−k, xi − x(2), xk + x(2))(2), as it is not
bigger than the fortune of players j and k. We can thus use parts (i) and (iv) of
Lemma 3 to obtain that (8) is not bigger than
1








n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)





= ui(1)|J(1)(a−i )| + 1
[
n(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
+ −n(n − 2)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)β − 2(n − 2)
2β3 − (n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)β
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
]
= ui(1)|J(1)(a−i )| + 1
n3(1 − β)3 − [(4 − 6n)β3 + 3n2β2 − n2β]
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) . (9)
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Now note that for any n ≥ 3 the function φn(β) := (4 − 6n)β3 + 3n2β2 − n2β
achieves its biggest value7 on interval [0,1] for β = 1, and so (note that the denu-
merator of (9), as well as coefficient depending on ui(1), are always positive) (9) is
for any β ∈ (0,1) bigger than
ui(1)
|J(1)(a−i )| + 1
n3(1 − β)3 − (2n2 − 6n + 4)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β) .





ending the proof. 
Now we are ready to pass to the main part of the proof of Theorem 1.





gi ∈ FWBi : ∀x ∈ S, supp
(
gi(x)
) ∈ B(sym(fi ),fi ),x,βi (f−i )}.




, Bβ is nonempty valued. It is imme-
diate to see that all the values of Bβ are convex and compact. Next note that by
Lemma 2.1 in [1] the expected discounted reward of player i is for any given x a
jointly continuous function of the strategies of the players. As the set FWBi is com-
pact, also V f−ii = maxfi∈FWBi Ji(x, (f−i , fi)) is a continuous function of f−i . This
implies that clearly also for any ai ∈ Ai(x), Ef−i [Kf,x,βi (a−i , ai)] is a continuous
function of f−i . Therefore if we take sequences f ni → fi and gni → gi , satisfy-






−i ), then, since supp(gi) ⊂ supp(gni ) for n
large enough (otherwise gi could not be the limit of (gni )), for any such n and any









i (a−i , ai)
] ≥ Esym(f ni )[K(sym(f ni ),f ni ),x,βi (a−i , bi)]





i (a−i , ai)
] ≥ Esym(fi )[K(sym(fi ),fi ),x,βi (a−i , bi)],
which means that gi ∈ B(sym(fi ),fi ),x,βi (f−i ). This proves that the graph of Bβ
is closed. Since also, by Lemma 2, FWBi is a convex compact subset of a Eu-
clidean space, Bβ satisfies all the assumptions of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [3].
Hence there exists a fixed point f ∗i for the correspondence Bβ . By standard dy-
namic programming arguments8 f ∗i , is the best response of player i to the profile
7This can be easily checked analyzing the way the sign of the derivative of φn changes on the interval and
comparing the values of φn at the ends of the interval.
8Note that by assumption V
f ∗−i
i
is the reward corresponding to the best weakly bold strategy of player
i against f ∗−i , while by Lemma 4 f ∗i is the best weakly bold answer to f ∗−i . These two facts obviously
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f ∗−i = sym(f ∗i ) not only in game (f ∗, x,β), but also in the stochastic game, and
thus f ∗ = (sym(f ∗i ), f ∗i ) is a symmetric equilibrium in the stochastic game.





> 13 , thus, by (ii) proved above, the game has a weakly bold equilibrium
(f1, . . . , fn) for such a β . Suppose that there exists a state x such that x(1) = xi > x(2),
but player i is prescribed to bid x(2) with some positive probability (without loss of











But this is smaller than what he could gain by playing x(2) +1—in that case he would
gain ui(1) in the first step and at least βui(1)2n in the second one (as with probability 1n
he returns to x, where he gains at least another ui(1)2 ). Thus there is no state x such
that x(1) = xi > x(2) such that player i is prescribed to bid x(2) with some positive
probability and so fi is a bold strategy.
Proof of (iii) Let us consider state x∗ = (0−i−j ,2s + 1, s) (where 0 denotes the
vector of n zeros) and denote:
(1) by w∗ the expected reward of player i when he starts in state x∗ and uses some
bold strategy fi over whole course of the game against a vector of bold strategies
from the others f−i ,
(2) by v∗ the expected reward of the same player when he choses to play s in the
first stage of the game and plays according to fi in the next stages (with opponents
applying the same bold strategies f−i as in the first case).
First note that in case (2) the player i receives reward ui(1) with probability 12 and
then moves to:
• state x∗ or another symmetric state (0−i−k,2s + 1, s) with probability 12 ;
• state (0−i−j−k, s +1, s, s) (for some k = i, j ) with probability 12 − 1n—in this state
he gains at least additional βu1(1) (in the second stage);
• state (0−i ,3s + 1) with probability 12n—in this state he also gains not less than
βui(1) in addition;
• state (0−i−j , s + 1,2s) with probability 12n .











Now, in case (1), when i uses a bold strategy, he receives reward ui(1) in the first
stage with probability 1 and then moves to:






satisfies the Bellman equations restricted to strategies from FWB
i
. However, since by
Lemma 4, f ∗
i
also maximizes the payoff of player i in case the action sets are not restricted, this is in fact
a globally best response of i against f ∗−i of the others.
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• state (0−i−j , s − α,2s + 1 + α), where α ≥ 0, with probability 1n .
This, through Lemma 3, implies that
w∗ ≤ ui(1) + (1 − p0)β
n
[
w∗ + (n − 2)
(
2βui(1)





n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)





w∗ + (n − 2)w∗∗ +
(
nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)




where p0 is the probability that α = 0, and w∗∗ is the reward of player i using fi
against f−i of the others in state x∗∗ = (0−i−j−k, s, s, s +1). Next, using the equality
from (ii) of Lemma 1 and writing ui(1) as p0ui(1) + (1 − p0)ui(1), (11) can be
rewritten as follows:
w∗ ≤ 1 − p0
n
[
βw∗ + (n − β)
(
nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)









n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
)]
. (12)
Note that in this particular state the behavior of players using bold strategies is
uniquely defined (players i and j play s, while k plays s + 1) and the game moves
either to state symmetric to x∗∗ (with probability n−2
n
) or to x∗ (with probability 1
n
),




(n − 2)w∗∗ + w∗ +
(
nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)










n − (n − 2)β .
Substituting this into (12) we obtain:
w∗ ≤ 1 − p0
n
[
βw∗ + (n − β)
(
nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)








n − (n − 2)β + β
)




n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
)]
= 1 − p0
n
[
βw∗ + (n − β)
(
nui(1)
n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)






n − (n − 2)β w
∗ + nβ




n − 2β +
2(n − 2)β2ui(1)
(n − 2β)(n − (n − 2)β)(1 − β)
)]
. (13)
Of course, we can get rid of p0, whose value we do not know, writing instead of (13)
the following two inequalities, at least one of which is implied by (13) (as we shall
























Fix now β ∈ ( 12 ,1) and suppose that playing bold is optimal for i in x∗, that is w∗ ≥
v∗, which together with (10) gives
w∗ ≥ n + β(n − 1)
(2 − β)n ui(1).
This by (14) implies that one of the following two inequalities holds:⎧⎨
⎩
n+β(n−1)




(2−β)n ui(1) ≤ n−(n−2)βn−(n−1)β ui(1) + βn−(n−1)β ( nui (1)n−2β + 2(n−2)β
2ui(1)
(n−2β)(n−(n−2)β)(1−β) ).
Now note that the limit as n → ∞ of the LHS of the above inequalities is 1+β2−β ui(1),
while the limits of each of the RHSs are equal to ui(1). If we take an n such that
all the above terms are within 2β−12(2−β)ui(1) > 0 from their limits, we obtain in both
inequalities that:
1 + β
2 − β ui(1) +
2β − 1
2(2 − β)ui(1) ≤ ui(1) −
2β − 1
2(2 + β)ui(1).
This can be rewritten as
2(1 + β) + (2β − 1) ≤ 2(2 − β) − (2β − 1).
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But this is only possible if β ≤ 12 , contradicting the assumption that β > 12 . This
means that playing bold cannot be optimal for i in state x∗. 
5 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and Lemma 3.
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